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Achievably-Efficient Enrollments Using High Tuition-High Aid in Public Higher Education 
Gary Fethke*  
 
Abstract 
With public universities tuitions and state appropriations are determined as efficiently as possible 
(“quasi-efficiently”) to cover fixed costs, an opportunity arises to admit additional low-income 
students at marginal cost.  Using this tuition-appropriation approach, an implementable form of 
pay-what-you-can-afford tuition policy (PWYCA) can realize fully-efficient enrollments. This 
construction can be extended to include a standard, often legal, constraint that state 
appropriations must be used to support reduced resident tuitions. When applied to budget, 
tuition, enrollment and appropriation data of colleges at Penn State University, this high tuition- 
high aid policy not only accommodates additional low-cost enrollments but also increases social 
welfare. 
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1. Introduction 
There are considerable differences among public universities, which range from open- 
access, two-year programs that depend almost entirely on public support, to selective, “very-high 
research” universities that possess considerable tuition-setting autonomy.  To various degrees, 
however,  public universities share several prominent features: i) there are two primary revenue 
sources (state appropriations and tuition revenues); ii) appropriations are employed to enhance 
resident access; iii) a break-even requirement is imposed on university profitability; iv) fixed 
cost is a high percentage of total cost; and v) nonresidents pay more.  Implications of these 
features are examined in tuition-setting models that compare welfare rankings associated with 
adopting so-called “pay-what-you-can-afford” (PWYCA) tuitions.1  This approach charges more 
to those with high ability to pay, enabling support of students with low ability to pay.  While 
PWYCA directly considers ability to pay, it is extended here to consider cost differences as well 
as residency restrictions placed on state appropriations.  A requirement that taxpayer funds can 
only be used to enhance resident access is shown here to be a primary contributor to inefficient tuitions. 
Turner (2018) considers a long- standing issue: “whether a “high tuition- high aid” 
strategy would be more equitable and efficient than would a low tuition strategy at state 
universities?”  Equity consideration focus on issues surrounding: Who should pay?  For example, 
recent calls for “free higher education” imply that it is best supported by taxpayer appropriations; 
alternatively, full privatization implies exclusive reliance on tuition revenue.  With greater 
reliance on private tuition revenue, an opportunity arises to move beyond a resident-nonresident 
                                                          
1 A PWYCA tuition approach is promoted by Robert Birgeneau, chancellor of UC Berkeley (2004-13), and Mary 
Sue Coleman, president of the University of Michigan (2003-14), who serve as co-presidents of the Lincoln Project 
on Higher Education supported by the American Academy of Arts and Sciences; see 
https://www.amacad.org/content/Research/researchproject.aspx?d=929. 
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distinction to charge more to some residents as a way to subsidize others.  A welfare issue 
concerns whether average tuition increases with tuition discrimination.  Using standard welfare 
criteria, where efficiency is based on students’ and taxpayers’ willingness to pay net of 
opportunity costs, the models developed here address these issues.  Specifically, using consumer 
surplus as a measure of value, monetary gains to low-pay residents are compared to monetary 
losses of high-pay residents and nonresidents.  Comparative evaluations of tuition-appropriation 
arrangements are presented in a context of familiar public university budgeting templates, with 
distinctions made among colleges.  
In a specified two-stage model, a legislature in stage one determines appropriations, 
based on tuitions set in stage two.2  Appropriations can support specific programs by reducing 
marginal costs, or they can be applied with an equivalent welfare effect as a direct offset against 
fixed cost.  Additionally, legislatures typically impose residency restrictions that permit all 
residents to pay less than nonresidents, and these restrictions adversely affect the attainable 
degree of efficiency; absent residency restrictions, social welfare increases.  A university in stage 
two takes appropriations and residency restrictions as given and determines rules for setting 
tuitions.  Resulting tuition structures encompass both average tuition and deviations in tuitions 
across programs.  
Several specific tuition-setting rules are evaluated, with a progression introducing 
increased endogeneity of appropriations and tuitions.  The first situation, called “Pay-What-You-
                                                          
2 Allowing endogenous changes in tuitions and appropriations can accommodate consideration of 
the enrollment mix across colleges, for example, with nonresidents replacing residents.  Some 
public universities, with limited pricing discretion, must reduce expenditures when facing 
declining public appropriations.  While it is typically assumed that exogenous reductions in 
appropriations lead to increases in tuition and reduction in expenditures, there remains an issue 
of causation.  Baum et al. (2018) provide a non-technical discussion of these and related issues.  
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Can-Afford” (PWYCA), is suggested by AAAS (2016).  Their proposal is to allocate a given 
state appropriation to high willingness to pay residents (H-residents) such that their tuitions equal 
nonresident tuitions (N-residents) net of a uniform state appropriation per H-resident.  Resulting 
incremental resident tuition revenue is then used to subsidize low-income residents (L-residents).  
For the AAAS suggested example of the University of Michigan, a claim is made that nearly 
$100 million of annual incremental revenue will result by adopting PWYCA; this increment is 
about 8 percent of tuition revenue.  A key assumption in this version of high tuition-high aid is 
that state appropriations will remain fixed when there are changes in rules for determining 
resident tuitions.   
PWYCA ideas can be extended and generalized by embedding them into a welfare-
maximizing context, where resident tuitions, nonresident tuitions and appropriations are selected 
to maximize social welfare.  Student welfare is measured by the (real) monetary value students 
receive after paying subsidized tuitions (net consumers’ surplus); university welfare is measured 
by net revenue; and social welfare is student welfare plus university welfare minus the 
appropriation.  With prominent fixed costs and a break-even requirement, tuitions charged to N-
residents and H-residents and state appropriations are determined to be as close as possible to 
efficient structures; see Baumol and Bradford (1970) for a seminal discussion of quasi-efficient 
pricing; Burer and Fethke (2016) provide an extension, with applications, to include subsidized 
arrangements of American public higher education; and Vogelsang and Finsinger (1979) develop 
an implementable algorithm.  One motivation for this pricing exercise is a claim that public 
universities will make efficient adjustments in their tuitions if given latitude to do so; Kim and 
Strange (2016) indicate, at least for the Texas System, that this is indeed a plausible outcome. 
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A standard feature of quasi-efficient tuitions is that they must exceed marginal costs to 
provide sufficient net tuition revenue to cover fixed costs net of the public appropriation — 
higher tuitions are optimally charged in programs that feature less elastic demands.  This 
standard pricing result is of interest in a PWYCA context: with H-residents and N-residents 
paying tuitions that exceed marginal costs, it is possible to admit L-residents at marginal at costs 
and still meet the break-even requirement.  Indeed, the more H-resident and N-resident tuitions 
optimally deviate from marginal costs, the higher is the achievable lower-price L-resident 
enrollment share.  This result holds even when there is an imposed residency restriction; the 
restricted quasi-efficient tuition structure can still accommodate additional L-resident 
enrollments at marginal cost.  Put another way, second-best tuitions supplemented with 
incremental enrollments priced at marginal-costs can support a first-best enrollment outcome for 
residents.  While tuition discrimination can eliminate an enrollment inefficiency for residents, a 
residency restriction increases it for nonresidents. 
To evaluate appropriation-tuition structures, demand and cost functions are calibrated to 
replicate standard budget templates.  The example used is for Pennsylvania State University-
Main Campus (PSU-MC), which is a large, “very high research” public university.  PSU stands 
out for experiencing large cuts in state appropriations per enrollment between 2001 and 2017 
(SHEF); these cuts were associated with charging comparatively high net tuitions, with  limited 
discounting (Burd, 2018).  The approach here examines alternative high tuition-high aid 
appropriation and tuition structurers and provides comparative dollar-based measures of student, 
university and social welfare.  It is shown that actual PSU-MC tuitions can be reasonably 
replicated using a modified version of a residency-restricted-tuition model developed by Burer 
and Fethke (2016).  An efficiency loss occurs because of residency restriction placed on 
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tuitions— removing this residency restriction increases economic efficiency by placing emphasis 
on willingness to pay.  
 Section 2 presents tuitions-setting models that illustrate main PWYCA features, with 
subsequent progression accommodating increased endogeneity for both tuitions and 
appropriations.  Section 3 provides budget, tuition, enrollment, and appropriation data for PSU-
MC that are used to quantify efficiency and equity implications of adopting particular tuition-
setting scenarios.  Section 4 contains a summary.  Section 5, Appendix, presents demand and 
cost parameters used for PSU. 
2. PWYCA tuition-setting rules 
Distinguishing among colleges (programs) at the university level and between resident and 
nonresidents, let the set of colleges be },...,1{ nI ≡  indexed by i, and let }2,1{≡J  be the 
enrollment types within each college—resident and nonresident— indexed by j.  For each pair 
),( ji  there are demand curves ijijijij TbaE −=  with given positive parameters ija  and ,ijb  where 
ijE  are enrollments type j in college i and ijT are corresponding tuitions.  The parameters ija  and 
ijb  reflect maximum enrollment and tuition responsiveness for each program, respectively, with 
ijij ba /  being maximum willingness to pay.  Tuition elasticity is ( / ),ij ij ij ijb T Eη = −  and net 
consumer surplus for each program is .2/2 ijij bE   Marginal costs, ,ic  are constant and 
independent of residency status, and there are fixed costs, F, with total cost: .
2
11
FEcC
j
ij
n
i
i += ∑∑
==
  
2.1 PWYCA resident tuitions with exogenous nonresident tuitions and state appropriations  
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A proposed PWYCA rule for representing “high-pay” resident tuitions (H-residents) in a 
public university is:  
/iH iN iH
i
T T A E= − ∑ , for 1,2,...,i n=        (1) 
Here, iHT  and iNT  are H-resident and nonresident (N-residents) tuitions, respectively, for each 
academic program, with A  representing the state appropriations.  Absent state support, H-
residents pay the same as N-residents; “free education” for residents requires tuition per resident 
to equal zero.  It is initially assumed that appropriations and N-resident tuitions are given, with 
these restrictions subsequently removed.  Using Eq. (1), H-resident enrollments in program i are:  
( / ).iH iR iR iN iH
i
E a b T A E= − − ∑         (2) 
A program’s enrollment depends positively on appropriations and negatively on non-resident 
tuitions.  Summing and solving for total H-resident enrollment yields: 
2 1/2(1 / 2){( ) [( ) 4 ] }iH R iR iN R iR iN R
i i i
E a b T a b T b A= − + − +∑ ∑ ∑ ,     (3) 
where R iR
i
a a≡∑ and .R iR
i
b b≡∑   Incremental revenue from H-residents and N-residents is:  
( )( ) .iN i iH iN
i
I T c E E F= − + −∑           (4) 
Marginal contributions of H-resident and N-resident enrollments toward covering fixed cost are 
equivalent to N-resident tuitions minus marginal costs.  Positive incremental revenue requires 
that N-resident tuitions exceed fully allocated cost.  In particular, if N-resident tuitions equal 
fully allocated costs, 
,
/ ,iN i ij
i j
T c F E= + ∑  then Eq. (4) implies that 0.I =   
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One motivation behind PWYCA is to use its positive incremental revenue to provide 
access for low-pay residents (L-residents). 3  L-residents are assumed to confront the segments of 
residual demand curves below ,iHT  and therefore they face the same intercept and slope 
parameters as H-residents. When 0,I >  one way to ration student demand according to 
willingness to pay (efficient rationing) involves identifying a uniform rate to charge L-resident 
enrollments, ,L iHT T< which satisfies: 
 ( ) ( ) 0,i L iR iH L
i
c T b T T I− − − =∑   with .L iHT T≤       (5) 
Eq. (5) indicates that net expenditure required to accommodate additional L-resident enrollments 
will just offset incremental revenue captured by charging more to H-residents.4  When 0,I ≥ the 
solution to Eq. (5) is:     
1/2
2
( ) ( )
1 ( ) 4( ) .
2 2
iR i iH iR i iH i iR iH
i i i
L
R R R
b c T b c T I c b T
T
b b b
 + + −
 = + + 
  
∑ ∑ ∑
    (6) 
Public universities have two primary revenue sources, tuition and appropriation revenue, 
and they are required by their non-profit charters to break even.5  A break-even constraint acts as 
                                                          
3 Incremental revenue can be used to fully offset tuitions and fees to qualified, low-income 
applicants, which is a program developed at the University of Michigan; see Dynarski et al. 
(2018).  This approach requires some type of rationing process. 
 
4 This approach represents a simple way to avoid having to arbitrarily allocate a given 
incremental revenue across various programs.  Effectively, each L-resident is charged the 
university’s marginal cost, which is reduced to include any incremental revenue that develops 
using PWYCA. 
 
5Other income sources include: private donations, annual gift and endowment income, interest 
payments, and indirect cost recovery for research grants.  For most public universities these 
sources are relatively minor, but a few major research universities have significant donor 
income.  For example, annual payouts from endowment for the University of Michigan are as 
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a form of rationality constraint in the following sense: unless total revenue covers expenditures, 
the university cannot (rationally) provide education services.  The break-even condition for an L-
resident-augmented PWYCA is: 
[( )( ) ( ) ( )] 0.iN i iH iN i L iR iH L
i
T c E E c T b T T F− + + − − − =∑      (7) 
Here, LT  is given by Eq. (6).  Once fixed costs are covered, since ( ) ( ) 0,i L iR iH Lc T b T T− − =
additional L-residents can be admitted without violating the break-even condition,  
2.2 PWYCA resident tuitions with an endogenous appropriation 
Will legislatures provide an unchanged appropriation when they are confronted with a 
change in rules for setting resident tuitions?  A more complete solution accounts for endogeneity 
of appropriations.  This problem can be described as a two-stage game, with appropriations 
determined in stage one and resident tuitions, predicated on the appropriation, set in stage two.  
With breakeven holding, a plausible stage one objective describes a legislature as seeking a 
constant subsidy per resident enrollment, s, which maximizes student welfare (consumer surplus) 
net of the appropriation: 
2 2 2max[ ( ) / 2 ( ) / 2 / 2 ( )],iH iR iL iR iN iN iHs i i i i
E s b E s b E b s E s+ + −∑ ∑ ∑ ∑      (8) 
s.t. 
( ) ,iH
i
s E s M≤∑  with 1,2,..., .i n=         (9) 
Expression (8) is total welfare.  Expression (9) implies that subsidy of H-residents is constrained 
by state resources, M.  Assuming Eqs. (1) – Eqs. (7) hold, resident enrollments depend only on s.  
                                                          
large as state appropriations; see: https://record.umich.edu/articles/u-m-endowment-rebounds-
109b-138-percent-return.  
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The optimal appropriation is determined by solving Expression (8) and Expression (9) for the 
optimal value of s.  Using PSU data, numerical solutions to this problem are presented in Section 
3.3. 
2.3 Endogenous tuitions and appropriations   
In this section, tuitions and appropriations are endogenously determined.  Appropriations 
can be used differentially to subsidize individual program enrollments, or they can be used to 
offset fixed cost. The appropriation is specified as: ,ij ij
ij
A s E S≡ +∑ where ijs  is the subsidy per 
enrollment, and S is a direct offset against fixed cost. Burer and Fethke (2016) establish the 
optimal rule for determining stage two enrollments is:6 ( ),ij ij ij ijE b d sρ= +  where 
/ij ij ij id a b c≡ −   (1 / 2)(1 1 ),ρ κ= + −  and  
2
,
( ) / ( / ) / 4.ij ij ij i ij
i j
F S b a b c sκ ≡ − − +∑   
Enrollment in every program is proportional to subsidy-adjusted efficient enrollment, where a 
factor of proportionality, ,ρ is the determined degree of efficiency.7  Since ijd  represents 
maximum net private willingness to pay, an enrollment subsidy, ,ijs  is equivalent to a public-
supported net willingness to pay.  Of operational significance is the implication that changes in 
fixed cost have no effect on the ratio of adjusted enrollments between any two programs. 
                                                          
6 A two-stage model is also developed by Bound et al. (Forthcoming), who find empirical 
support for an inverse relationship between endogenous state appropriations and foreign student 
tuition revenue in major public universities. 
 
7 A more general representation for an enrollment rule can be derived using a generic student 
benefit expression, increasing marginal costs, and independent demand functions.  With linear 
demand and increasing marginal cost, ),1/()(),( iijijijijij ebsdbSsE ++= ρ with 0>ie representing 
the slope of marginal cost.  
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To include PWYCA features, appropriations are used entirely to support H-residents.  
Specifically, for N-resident, 0iNs =  and 
*ρ ρ= initially fixed ( *1/ 2 1),ρ≤ ≤  a stage-one 
optimization over unrestricted iHs and S is:  
*2 2 2 *
,
1max{ [ ( ( ) ) [ ( ) ]}
2 iH iH iH iN iN iH iH iH iHs S i i i
b s d b d b s d s Sρ ρ+ + − + +∑ ∑ ∑    (10) 
s.t.  
* ( )iH iH iH iH
i
b s d s S Mρ + + ≤∑         (11)
 
* * 2 * * 2(1 ) ( ) (1 )iH iH iH iN iN
i i
b s d b d F Sρ ρ ρ ρ− + + − = −∑ ∑      (12)  
1
2
1 * ≤≤ ρ            (13) 
          
 
Appropriation combines subsidies per H-resident enrollment, ,iHs  with a direct offset against 
fixed cost, S.  With enrollment rules given by *( )iH iH iHE d sρ= +  and 
* ,iN iNE dρ=  the 
legislature at stage one determines an appropriation structure that maximizes consumers’ surplus 
net of the constrained appropriation. In this context, Burer and Fethke (2016) demonstrate that a 
constant ad valorem subsidy is consistent with achievement of quasi-efficient enrollments.  
Specifically, ,iH iHs kd= where k is an ad valorem subsidy rate applied uniformly to all H-resident 
enrollments.  Using the break-even condition, Eq. (12), to eliminate S, the problem reduces to: 
* 2 2 * * * 21max{ ( (1 ) ) (1 ) [ (1 )( (1 ) )]}
2 H N H H Nk
k k k F kρ θ θ θ ρ ρ ρ θ θ+ + − + − − − + +   (14) 
s.t.  
* * * 2(1 ) [ (1 )( (1 ) )] ,H H Nk k F k Mθ ρ ρ ρ θ θ+ + − − + + ≤       (15) 
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where 2,j ij ij
i
b dθ ≡ ∑  with { , }.j H N∈   The optimal solution is the right-hand endpoint of Eq. 
(15):  
* *
* *
*
1 4( (1 ) )[1 2 ].
2
N H
H
F Mk ρ ρ θ θρ
ρ θ
− − + +
= − +      (16) 
Specification of *ρ determines unique values for *k and *.S   Consistent with Expression (15), 
these values ensure that the total appropriation equals its constrained amount, M.  Eq. (16) is 
used to eliminate *k  in Eq. (14), yielding a concave expression for welfare in terms of :*ρ  
* * * *1( ) ( 2 2 2 4 4 4 (1 ) ))
4 N H H N H
W F M F Mρ ρ θ θ θ ρ ρ θ θ= − − + + + − + + − +    (17) 
Finally, the critical point of Eq. (17) is: 
 
* 1 4( )(0, ) (1 1 ).
2
M
H N
F MMρ ρ
θ θ
−
≡ = + −
+
       (18) 
The optimal, unrestricted solution for the tuition structure employs the entire appropriation to 
offset fixed costs.  The associated rule for tuitions is: 
(1 ) / .M M Mij ij ij iT a b cρ ρ= − +          (19) 
Tuitions in each program are a weighted average of maximum willingness to pay and marginal 
cost, with weights reflecting the optimal degree of efficiency.  Increased efficiency reduces the 
relative importance of willingness to pay.8  
                                                          
8 It can be demonstrated that: ( ) / (1 ) / ,M Mij i i ijT c c ρ η− = − − where ijη is elasticity of demand, 
measured where tuition equals marginal cost.  This is an established quasi-efficient pricing 
result—programs that exhibit less elastic demands are charged higher prices.  Here, the 
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Eq. (19) indicates that optimal tuitions must exceed marginal costs to offset fixed cost.  
This condition in a PWYCA context creates an opportunity to provide enhanced access for L-
residents.  Specifically, once fixed costs are fully covered by H-residents and N-residents, 
additional enrollments can be admitted at marginal cost (“marginal-cost enrollments”).  
Specifically, these additional L-residents can be accommodated at marginal costs, without 
reducing welfare of either those already enrolled, the university or taxpayers. 
Marginal-cost enrollments are: ( ).M Mij ij ij iE b T c∆ = −   When these enrollments are added to 
quasi-efficient enrollments, total enrollment is fully-efficient, that is, 
( / ).M Mij ij ij ij ij iE E b a b c+ ∆ = −   Thus, a third-degree tuition discrimination scheme that adds 
marginal-cost priced L-enrollments to quasi-efficient enrollments achieves first-best total 
enrollment.9  Using this result and Eq. (19) implies: 
.
M
ij M
M M
ij ij
E
E E
ρ=
∆ +
          (20) 
The ratio of quasi-efficient to fully-efficient enrollment for each program equals the common 
degree of efficiency.  With 1,Mρ =  all enrollments are priced at marginal costs; alternatively, 
with 1 / 2,Mρ =  N-resident and H-resident enrollments are priced at profit-maximizing rates, and 
L-resident enrollments are priced at marginal costs.  
                                                          
conceptual enhancements are inclusion of public-appropriation support and closed-form 
determination of optimal efficiency, as given by Eq. (18). 
 
9 Total consumer surplus is still affected by a dead-weight loss associated with the need to set H-
resident and N-resident tuitions above marginal cost to cover any fixed costs not offset by the 
appropriation. 
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When the appropriation is used entirely to reduce H-resident tuitions: 
* *(1 ) ( / ),iH iR iR iR iE k b a b cρ= + −  
* *(1 (1 )) ( / ),iL iR iR iR iE k b a b cρ= − + −
* ( / ),iN iN iN iN iE b a b cρ= −  
and * * * * 2(1 )( (1 ) ).u rS F kρ ρ θ θ= − − + +   Here, 
*k and *S depend on the fixed value of *.ρ   
Regardless *,ρ and the associated unique values of *,k and *,S the combined enrollments of H-
residents and L-residents will equal first-best (efficient) enrollment, that is, 
( / ).iH iL iR iR iR iE E b a b c+ = −    
One interesting solution is found by identifying *ρ and associated unique values of *k for 
which * 0.S =   The determined value of *ρ  reduces H-resident enrollments and increases L-
resident enrollments, but has no effect on total resident enrollment, which remains fully efficient.  
N-enrollments, however, inefficiently decline from unrestricted levels.  Basically, appropriations 
used to subsidize H-residents reduce the achievable degree of efficiency and welfare by 
imposing a larger dead-weight loss on N-residents. 
3. Examples using PSU-MC budgets, enrollments, tuitions and appropriation 
 3.1 PSU base-level 
The data in Table 1 are budget allocations, enrollments, and shared-service expenditures 
for Pennsylvania State University-University Park, for FY 2018 (PSU-MC).  These data are used 
to calibrate enrollment demand curves, ,ij ij ij ijE a b T= − with 1,2,...,i n=  colleges and 1,2j =  
resident and nonresident enrollment categories, respectively.  Cost functions presume 
independent, constant marginal cost for each program, .ic 10  In developing demand-curves, it is 
                                                          
10 These demand and cost expressions can be used to replicate standard budget data as prepared 
by public universities.  In particular, this approach permits asking “What If?” questions in 
context of familiar budgetary templates.  Calibration details for demand and cost expressions are 
given in notes associated with Table 1, and in the Appendix, Table 7; they are also discussed in 
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assumed that a common elasticity of demand is – 1.11  Marginal costs are college budget 
allocations divided by total enrollment.  Values for demand and cost parameters are presented in 
the Appendix, Table 7.   
Demand and cost curves developed for the base case exactly replicate actual college 
budgets, tuitions and enrollments for PSU-MC (FY 2018).  Marginal cost per SCH for the entire 
university is $400; enrollment-weighed N-resident tuition is $1,324 and H-resident tuition is 
$713.  The appropriation per H-resident is $220.  Across all programs, tuitions are greater than 
marginal costs, with N-residents always paying more.12  Similar tuitions are charged across 
colleges, regardless of differences in program costs— the mean absolute deviation of H-resident 
tuition, for example, is $19.5 per SCH, while that for marginal cost is $118 per SCH.  Welfare, 
which is measured by consumers’ surplus of H-residents and N-residents plus university net 
revenue minus the state appropriation, is $515.6 M.  The majority of student credit-hours (SCHs) 
are in the College of Liberal Arts (LA).  Maximum willingness to pay in LA per resident SCH is 
$1,387 and $2,597 per nonresident SCH; marginal cost in LA is $279; base-level LA resident 
tuition is $693, and base-level LA nonresident tuition is $1,299.  Other colleges can be similarly 
described.  Alternative tuition configurations constructed using base-level parameters can 
                                                          
Burer and Fethke (2016).  Also, see Altonji and Zimmerman (2018, Table 3) for their attempt to 
develop cost estimates for various majors, using Florida System data.  
 
11 There is flexibility is selecting initial elasticities, which can vary from program to program as 
well as by residency status.  Alternatively, maximum willingness to pay, / ,ij ija b can be specified 
a priori, and these values, along with initial values of ijT and ,ijE  can be used to calibrate demand 
curves. 
 
12 The fact that H-resident tuitions exceed marginal costs is noteworthy.  In similar calibrations 
for the University of Iowa, Iowa State University, the University of Florida, and the University 
of Michigan, actual resident tuitions are uniformly below marginal costs.  
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provide useful insights about their effectiveness.  In particular, the level and distribution of 
welfare among residents, nonresidents and taxpayers will be compared to these base-level 
amounts. 
TABLE 1 Here 
Since H-resident tuitions all exceed marginal costs in the base configuration, it is possible 
to consider a counter-factual circumstance of admitting additional L-residents by charging them 
less. The results shown in Table 1.1.  Using actual H-resident tuitions in Eq. (6), with 0,I =  
each additional L-resident can be charged a uniform rate of $405.3— this contributes 315,244 
SCH enrollments.  Welfare augmented to include additional L-residents is $564.1 M.  Since 
base-case 0,I =  an efficient alternative is to charge L-residents their marginal program costs, 
with the resulting augmented welfare being $572 M.  
TABLE 1.1 HERE 
3.2 PWYCA with exogenous appropriations 
The results of imposing Eqs. (1)— (7) with a given appropriation are presented in Table 
2.  Here, H-resident tuition in each college equals N-resident tuition minus a uniform allocation 
of $349 per H-resident SCH that exhausts the state appropriation.  While the appropriation per 
H-resident is larger than the base level of $220, H-resident tuition increases by $262 per SCH.  
The incremental revenue generated, $37.5 ,I M= accommodates a uniform L-resident tuition of 
$345 per SCH, which covers the variable cost of 646,500 L-resident SCHs.  Upward Adjustment 
of welfare to include these enrollments is $562.6 M, which is just $1.5 M (-0.27%) less than 
similarly-adjusted base welfare. With the appropriation given, average resident tuition becomes 
$623, which is lower than the base level of $713.  
TABLE 2 HERE 
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3.3 PWYCA with exogenous appropriation. 
Determining the appropriation to maximize constrained welfare, as represented by Eq. (8) 
and Eq. (9), provides the results in Table 2.  When free to adjust, the appropriation declines from 
$161.3 M to $132.2 M ( 18%)− .  This decline is offset by a $6.7M increase in tuition revenue and 
a $29M decrease in variable expenditures.  H-resident tuitions increase in every college, with an 
average increase from the base level of $37 per SCH.  There is a decline in incremental revenue, 
from $37.5 M with a given appropriation to $2.3 M with an adjusting appropriation; L-resident 
tuition increases from $345 to $400.  With a declining appropriation, value is transferred from 
residents to taxpayers, however, total welfare of $564.1 M is essentially the same as augmented 
base-level welfare, $564.3 M.  The total PWYCA enrollment is just 5,677 SCHs greater than the 
similarly augmented base enrollment.  
TABLE 3 HERE 
3.4 Endogenous tuitions and appropriation with the appropriation subsidizing H-residents 
This case presents endogenously determined tuitions and appropriation.  To capture a key 
feature of PWYCA, the appropriations is restricted to subsidizing only H-resident enrollments; 
otherwise all tuitions are determined.  For the optimal solution, programs featuring high net 
willingness to pay are assigned a high subsidy per H-resident SCH. The legislative budget 
constraint binds at its capacity amount.  These results are presented in Table 4. The determined 
ad valorem subsidy rate per H-resident SCH when * 0S =  is: * 21%.k =   The degree of 
efficiency determined such that * 21%k = , * 0S =  is * 59%,ρ =  and welfare is: * $563.6 .W M=   
With H-resident tuitions exceeding marginal costs, a uniform tuition charged L-residents, as 
determined by Eq. (6), is: $447.LT =   An additional 258,703 L-resident enrollments contribute 
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$21.5 M to both tuition revenue and variable costs.  The resulting L-resident augmented budget 
is presented in the first column of Table 4.  
TABLE 4 HERE 
A striking aspect of this subsidy-restricted case is its conformity to base levels, as 
presented in Table 1.  N-resident total enrollment and average tuition are practically the same.  
Average H-resident tuition of $690 is just $23 per SCH lower than base tuition of $713.  Minor 
differences in program tuitions are due primarily to the fact that H-resident tuitions in LA and 
Science are moderately lower.  Charging quasi-efficient tuitions does, however, increase 
differences among tuitions—the mean absolute deviation in H-resident tuitions is $96, compared 
to $19.5 for the base case.  Differences in total welfare are not material.  Welfare declines 
slightly from base welfare, but the decrease is only 0.27%.−   
3.5 Unrestricted tuitions and appropriation 
The final situation considered places no restrictions on either tuitions or appropriations.  
The optimal tuitions and enrollments are those occurring when the entire appropriation is applied 
entirely to offset fixed costs, with results presented in Table 5.  Eliminating a subsidy of H-
residents increases H-resident tuitions in most colleges and reduces N-resident tuitions.  The only 
H-resident tuition to decline slightly— from $693 to $681— is that for LA.  Average H-resident 
tuitions increase by $51, and average N-resident tuition decreases by -$114.  There is also a 
modest reduction for L-resident tuition from $447 per SCH to $432 per SCH.  This unrestricted 
case, however, stands out with its pronounced efficiency implication. Eliminating favorable 
treatment of H-residents increases total welfare by $49 M (9 %).  Thus, a major impediment to 
greater efficiency is associated with using the appropriation to subsidize H-residents.  
TABLE 5 HERE 
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3.6 Who wins and who loses? 
Table 6 summarizes patterns of tuitions, enrollments and value distribution for each 
tuition-setting configuration. When compared to base levels, H-resident tuitions increase for 
PWYCA and decreases for QE.  Enrollment-weighted tuition typically decreases, except for the 
endogenous-appropriation PWYCA case.  The lowest average tuition occurs when there are no 
residency restrictions; this result is entirely due to reductions in N-resident tuitions.13 Turner’s 
earlier question (“whether a “high tuition- high aid” strategy would be more equitable and 
efficient than would a low tuition strategy at state universities?”) appears to be answered in 
affirmatively with adoption of the unrestricted tuitions.  
For PWYCA, where appropriations are used to support H-resident enrollments, total 
welfare is basically unaffected by the designated tuition structure.  What does change is 
assignment of “who pays.”   PWYCA tuitions with a given appropriation reallocates value from 
H-residents to L-residents, without changing N-resident value.  When the appropriation adjusts, 
this value transfer is accompanied by a decline in the appropriation.  For the restricted-subsidy 
QE case, results are remarkably similar to the base case.  When no restrictions are placed on 
tuitions, there is an increase in welfare over the equivalent base of nearly 9%, which signifies 
value transfers to L-residents and N-residents from H-residents.   
TABLE 6 HERE 
                                                          
13 Starting from base enrollments, adoption of quasi-efficient (QE) tuitions decreases average 
tuition, increases total enrollment, and increases welfare. Standard economic efficiency implies 
that all students have the same marginal valuation for the same education.  If marginal cost is the 
same for everyone, there develops a loss in efficiency by charging different tuitions.  Setting 
differentiated tuitions offset this loss in value only if they lead to an increase in total enrollment; 
see Schmalensee (1981) for establishment of this condition under general conditions.  
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4. Summary 
Under one version of “Pay What You Can Afford” (PWYCA), residents are charged 
nonresident tuitions net of a uniform allocation of a given state appropriation.  The motivation is 
to charge nonresidents and some residents more to support enhanced access for low-income 
residents.  In an initial proposal by AAAS (2016), it is assumed without question that both 
nonresident tuitions and state appropriations are exogenous.  These restrictions can be relaxed, 
allowing both tuitions and appropriations to be endogenously determined.   
High tuition-high aid situation considered here develop “quasi-efficient” tuitions and 
appropriations that may include a constraint that state appropriations be used to support resident 
enrollments.  The presence of fixed costs and a break-even requirement typically imposed on 
public universities reduce obtainable degrees of efficiency.  When appropriations are used to 
support reduced resident tuitions, small differences in total welfare develop among the 
considered versions of PWYCA, regardless of whether state appropriations respond to changes 
in rules for setting tuitions.  There are, however, substantial transfers of value among high-pay 
residents, nonresidents, low-pay residents and taxpayers.  Inefficiency in tuition setting is 
imposed by subsidizing residents, and is a distinguishing equity-related factor in deciding “Who 
Pays.”  When this restriction is removed, there is a 9% increase in total welfare, nearly all of 
which accrues to nonresidents. 
Under quasi-efficient pricing, once some residents and nonresidents are charged enough 
to cover variable and shared fixed costs, the resulting tuitions will optimally exceed marginal 
costs. Under these conditions, there exists an opportunity to enroll lower-ability-to pay students 
by charging tuitions that cover marginal costs.  If PWYCA approach is taken, the tuition 
structure can support first-best total enrollment outcomes.  Put another way, combing quasi-
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efficient tuitions for high-pay residents and nonresidents with marginal-cost pricing for low-pay 
residents will increase both enrollment and welfare.  Even when state support is restricted to 
residents, adding marginal-cost enrollments can accommodate increases in resident enrollment 
and overall welfare.  The numerical results for this restricted-tuition case closely mimics the 
actual Penn State budget, enrollment and tuition-structure configuration. This, admittedly, 
limited example does imply that quasi-efficient tuition-setting structures can provide a plausible 
description for public university pricing. 
5. Appendix 
TABLE 7 HERE 
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Table 1 
Base-level Budgets, Enrollments, Tuitions, Costs, Appropriation, and Welfare for PSU-
Main Campus (MC), FY-2018 
PSU-MC Base-Budget N-Res N-res. H-Res. H-Res.
Allocations Enrollments Tuitions Enrollments Tuitions
Ag Science $27,266,142 17,743       $1,332 31,748     $712
Arts & Architecture $38,358,447 34,148       $1,298 39,570     $693
Business $56,294,907 56,665       $1,349 64,447     $746
Communications $14,617,498 21,729       $1,310 19,390     $705
E&M Sciences $41,097,810 41,037       $1,356 37,136     $732
Education $28,384,682 15,045       $1,349 25,506     $735
Engineering $92,176,379 76,274       $1,363 86,204     $737
Health & Human Dev. $40,535,510 49,203       $1,305 71,574     $703
Info. Sci. & Tech. $15,615,059 14,976       $1,337 18,022     $725
Liberal Arts $98,489,672 171,412     $1,299 182,024   $693
Nursing $4,838,637 2,661         $1,370 7,087       $772
Science - Eberly $86,052,890 127,801     $1,322 149,042   $707
Total to Colleges $543,727,633 628,693     $1,324 731,749   $713
Fixed Cost $971,366,890
Total Perm. Expenses $1,515,094,523
Appropriation $161,305,200
Appro.  Per Resident $220
Tuition Revenue $1,353,789,323
Total Rev. $1,515,094,523
Resident. Elasticity -1
Nonresident  Elasticity -1
Base Welfare $515,589,461  
Notes:  Actual college budgets, enrollments and tuitions are provided from publically available 
sources by PSU administrators in the Smeal College of Business.  There are 12  colleges with 
enrollments and tuitions distinguished by H-residentt, and N-resident.  Budget allocations are 
“permenent” allocations that do not reflect temporary adjustments. Welfare is total consumers’ 
surplus plus net university revenue minus the appropriation. Demand and cost parameters 
developed from the data in Table 1 are presented in the Appendix, Table 7. 
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Table 1.1 
Augmented Base-Level Budgets to Include L-Resident Enrollments 
PSU-UC Base L-Res. Augmented Base
TL Enrollment TL Budgets
Ag Science 13,677          $32,805,429.23
Arts & Architecture 16,430          $45,012,794.84
Business 29,439          $68,217,645.56
Communications 8,248            $17,957,817.79
E&M Sciences 16,594          $47,818,345.67
Education 11,449          $33,021,607.44
Engineering 38,808          $107,893,776.56
Health & Human Dev. 30,332          $52,820,095.10
Info. Sci. & Tech. 7,960            $18,838,854.55
Liberal Arts 75,695          $129,146,165.38
Nursing 3,370            $6,203,530.64
Science - Eberly 63,625          $111,821,176.80
Total to Colleges/Campus 315,629        $671,557,240
L-Res. Uniform Tuition (TL) $405
Augmented Welfare at TL $564,256,080
Augmented Welfare at MC $571,970,158  
   
Notes:  L-Resident enrollments are computed using base-level resident tuitions and Eq. (6) to 
calculate TL.  Augmented base-level budget allocations  associated with these enrollments are 
presented, as are two measures of welfare—welfare including TL enrollments and welfare 
measured when L-Residents pay marginal cost (marginal-cost enrollments). 
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Table 2  
 
PWYCA Budgets, Enrollments, Tuitions, and Welfare with Exogenous Appropriation 
 
PSU-MC Budget N-Res. N-Res. H-Res. H-Res L-Res.
Exogenous Case Allocations Enroll. Tuitions  Enroll. Tuitions Enroll.
Ag Science $36,268,393 17,743   $1,332 19,630    $983 28,457    
Arts & Architecture $48,681,933 34,148   $1,298 24,919    $949 34,491    
Business $72,376,264 56,665   $1,349 42,466    $1,000 56,578    
Communications $18,133,111 21,729   $1,310 12,337    $961 16,942    
E&M Sciences $51,412,925 41,037   $1,356 23,178    $1,007 33,578    
Education $37,848,576 15,045   $1,349 16,287    $1,000 22,739    
Engineering $118,154,733 76,274   $1,363 53,694    $1,014 78,302    
Health & Human Dev. $52,755,234 49,203   $1,305 45,800    $956 62,183    
Info. Sci. & Tech. $20,083,379 14,976   $1,337 11,491    $988 15,973    
Liberal Arts $123,948,804 171,412 $1,299 114,711  $950 158,675  
Nursing $6,783,303 2,661     $1,370 4,806      $1,021 6,199      
Science - Eberly $109,741,957 127,801 $1,322 92,870    $973 132,382  
Totals $696,188,611 628,693 $1,324 462,189  $975 646,500  
Fixed Cost $971,366,890
Total Perm. Expenses $1,667,555,501
Appropriation $161,305,200
H-Res. Appropriation $349
Tuition Revenue $1,506,250,301
Total Revenue $1,667,555,501
Incremetal Revenue $37,556,612
L-Resident. Tuition $345
Welfare $562,626,460
Total Enrollment 1,737,381         
Average tuition $867  
  
Notes: N-resident enrollments and tuitions are those given in Table 1.  To calculate H-resident 
enrollments and tuitions, Eq. (2) and Eq. (3) are used, along with the respective demand curves.  
L-resident enrollments are given by ( ),iL iR iH LE b T T= − where LT is given by Eq. (6). 
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Table 3  
 
PWYCA Budgets, Enrollments, Tuitions, and Welfare with Endogenous Appropriation 
 
PSU-MC Budget H-Res. H-Res. L-Res.
Endogenous Case Allocations Enrollments Tuitions Enrollments 
Ag Science $34,928,134 17,973        $1,020 27,681        
Arts & Architecture $47,061,019 22,797        $986 33,498        
Business $70,185,647 39,255        $1,037 55,075        
Communications $17,599,870 11,315        $998 16,464        
E&M Sciences $49,959,058 21,295        $1,044 32,697        
Education $36,523,968 14,998        $1,038 22,136        
Engineering $114,534,959 49,347        $1,052 76,268        
Health & Human Dev. $50,891,841 42,018        $993 60,413        
Info. Sci. & Tech. $19,442,378 10,568        $1,025 15,542        
Liberal Arts $119,959,935 104,960      $987 154,111      
Nursing $6,534,929 4,465          $1,058 6,040          
Science - Eberly $106,167,645 85,037        $1,010 128,716      
Totals $673,789,381 424,029      $1,012 628,640      
Fixed Cost $971,366,890
Total Perm. Expenses $1,645,156,271
Appropriation $132,238,668
H-Res. Appropriation $312
Tuition Revenue $1,512,917,603
Total Revenue $1,645,156,271
Incremetal Revenue $2,308,040
L-Resident. Tuition $400
Welfare $564,153,604
Total Enrollment 1,681,362         
Average tuition $900  
Notes: Base N-resident enrollments and tuitions are those presented in Table 1. With a 
endogenous appropriation, the Solver NLP routine contained in Excel is used to find the subsidy 
per H-residents that maximizes total welfare, Eq. (8), constrained by a legislative budget 
constraint, Eq.(9). 
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Table 4 
Quasi-Efficient Tuition-Appropriation Structure with Subsidies Restricted to Reducing H-
Resident Tuitions 
PSU-MC Restricted QE N-Res. N-Res. H-Res. H-Res. L-Res.
Allocations Enroll Tuitions Enroll. Tuitions  Enroll.
Ag Science $33,091,186 16,495      $1,426 27,573       $805 15,994       
Arts & Architecture $44,553,726 32,002      $1,380 35,012       $772 18,611       
Business $67,519,651 54,972      $1,389 62,862       $764 27,425       
Communications $17,243,350 22,013      $1,293 20,549       $663 5,944         
E&M Sciences $47,523,674 38,777      $1,431 33,733       $799 17,885       
Education $33,998,563 13,061      $1,527 18,931       $924 16,579       
Engineering $108,324,116 70,800      $1,461 75,122       $831 45,019       
Health & Human Dev. $49,645,954 50,254      $1,277 77,215       $647 20,452       
Info. Sci. & Tech. $18,642,316 14,447      $1,384 17,210       $759 7,738         
Liberal Arts $118,751,211 179,355    $1,239 206,119     $602 40,672       
Nursing $6,268,641 2,554        $1,425 6,816         $802 3,260         
Science - Eberly $104,463,458 132,184    $1,277 164,765     $632 39,123       
Totals $650,025,845 626,914    $1,324 745,906     $690 258,703     
Fixed Cost $971,366,890
Total Permanent Expenses $1,621,392,735
Appropriation $161,305,200
Appropriation per H-Res. $216
Tuition Revenue $1,460,087,535
Total Revenue $1,621,392,735
L-Resident Tuition $447
ad valorem rate k 0.21
Offset to fixed cost  S $0
Efficiency rate ρ* 0.59
Welfare $563,560,726  
Notes: Demand and cost parameters used are presented in Appendix, Table 7.  Enrollments and 
tuitions are calculated assuming the appropriation is efficiently allocated to reduce H-resident 
tuitions. The optimal solution is found by iterating on *ρ to find a value of *k that is consistent 
with * 0.S =  Tuition for L-residents is given by Eq. (6). Budget allocations in Col. 1 use base-
level marginal costs and QE restricted enrollments for N-residents, H-residents, and L-residents. 
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Table 5 
Unrestricted Quasi-efficient Enrollments and Tuitions for PSU-Main Campus 
 
PSU-MC Unrestricted N-Res. N-Res. H-Res. H-Res. L-Res.
Allocations Enroll. Tuitions Enroll. Tuitions Enroll.
Ag Science $34,234,295 17,915    $1,319 24,768   $868 19,454    
Arts & Architecture $46,423,515 34,757    $1,275 31,449   $835 23,011    
Business $70,308,972 59,704    $1,277 56,466   $838 35,090    
Communications $18,060,537 23,908    $1,179 18,458   $739 8,438      
E&M Sciences $49,669,965 42,115    $1,321 30,301   $867 22,062    
Education $35,142,120 14,185    $1,427 17,005   $980 19,015    
Engineering $112,756,167 76,895    $1,352 67,479   $897 54,380    
Health & Human Dev. $51,599,477 54,580    $1,162 69,359   $725 29,803    
Info. Sci. & Tech. $19,403,394 15,691    $1,273 15,459   $829 9,854      
Liberal Arts $124,127,406 194,795  $1,122 185,147 $681 65,496    
Nursing $6,444,623 2,774      $1,312 6,122     $877 4,088      
Science - Eberly $108,962,587 143,563  $1,159 148,001 $712 58,982    
Totals $677,133,059 680,881  $1,210 670,015 $764 349,673  
Fixed Cost $971,366,890
Total Permanent Expenses $1,648,499,949
Appropriation $161,305,200
Appropriation per HP Res. $241
Tuition Revenue $1,487,194,748
Total Revenue $1,648,499,948
L- Resident Tuition $432
k $0
S $161,305,200
Rho 0.64  
Notes: Tuitions and accompanying enrollments are given by closed-form expressions, Eqs (18) 
and (19).  
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Table 6 
Comparative Efficiency and Equity Implications Associated with Tuition-setting Rules 
 
Tuition Structure Base PWYCA PWYCA QE QE
Value Distribution  Case Given Appro. Variable Appro. Restricted Unrestricted
H-Resident Tuition $713 $975 $1,012 $690 $764
N-Resident Tuition $1,324 $1,324 $1,324 $1,324 $1,210
L-resident Tuition $405 $345 $400 $447 $432
Average Tuition $922 $868 $924 $895 $874
H-Resident Enrollment 628,693      462,189         424,029            745,906       670,015         
N-Resident Enrollment 731,749      731,749         731,749            626,914       680,881         
L-Resident Enrollment 315,629      646,500         628,640            258,703       349,673         
Total Enrollment (SCHs) 1,676,071   1,840,438      1,784,418         1,631,523    1,700,569      
Tuition % change - 9.44% 12.07% -0.08% -2.77%
N-Residents Value $416.1 M $416.1 M $416.1 M $414.3 M $488.7 M
H-Residents Value $260.7 M $104.1 M $87.7 M $273.3 M $220.5 M
L-Residents Value $48.5 M $203.7 M $192.7 M $37.3 M $63.6 M
Appropriation ($161.3 M) ($161.3 M) ($132.2 M) ($161.3 M) ($161.3 M)
Total Value $564.1 M $562.6 M $564.2 M $563.6 M $611.5 M       
      
Note: In the first three situations, N-resident value is given.  With QE, both tuitions and the appropriation are 
endogenously determined.  In the restricted case, the entire appropriation is assigned to H-residents.  In the 
unrestricted QE, no residency constraints are imposed. The reported “tuition % change” is measured by a 
Laspeyres index, using base enrollments, base tuitions and calculated tuitions. Welfare is measured as net 
consumers’ surplus plus net university revenue minus the states appropriation, with value distributed among 
residents, nonresidents, and taxpayers. 
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Table 7 
Slopes, intercepts and marginal costs for PSU-MC  
PSU-MC Resident Resident Nonresident Nonresident Marginal
Slopes Intercepts Slopes Intercepts Costs
Ag Science 45            63,495         13 35,485        $551
Arts & Architecture 57            79,140         26 68,296        $520
Business 86            128,893       42 113,329      $465
Communications 28            38,780         17 43,458        $355
E&M Sciences 51            74,272         30 82,074        $526
Education 35            51,012         11 30,090        $700
Engineering 117          172,408       56 152,548      $567
Health & Human Dev. 102          143,147       38 98,405        $336
Info. Sci. & Tech. 25            36,044         11 29,952        $473
Liberal Arts 263          364,048       132 342,824      $279
Nursing 9             14,174         2 5,322          $496
Science - Eberly 211          298,084       97 255,602      $311
Totals 1,027       1,463,497     475 1,257,385   $400  
Notes: Demand-curve slopes and intercepts are developed using PSU-MC FY2018 data, 
gathered from publically available sources and provided by administrators at the Smeal College 
of Business at PSU.  With linear demand, ,ij ij ij ijE a b T= −  and using the assumed tuition elasticity 
of -1, slope parameters are determined from: / 1.ij ij ijb T E− = −   These estimates use actual 
tuitions and SCH enrollments in Table 1.  Intercepts are: .ij ij ij ija E b T= +   Maximum willingness 
to pay for each program is / .ij ija b   Marginal costs are calibrated by dividing actual FY 2018 
permanent budget allocations by total enrollments for each program. 
 
 
 
